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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States (U.S.) wine industry has become one of the most important,
lucrative, and rapidly growing industries for U.S. agriculture.' The United States is
the world's fourth largest producer, the fifth largest importer, and seventh largest
exporter of wine.2 In California alone, the wine industry is estimated to be worth
US$9 billion.3 In 1996, the value of U.S. wine exports increased by an impressive
thirty-five percent from 1995, totaling over US$326 million. Furthermore, the
volume of exports increased by twenty-two percent over the same period.
The European Union5 (EU), is the largest wine consuming community in the
world, and has been the biggest market for U.S. wine exports.6 In 1996, the total
value of U.S. wine exports into the EU increased by an incredible fifty-four percent.
7
Likewise, the volume of exports increased by thirty-three percent from the previous
year.8 Additionally, the Member States of the EU purchased forty-six percent of all
U.S. wine exported in 1996. The extraordinary sales of U.S. wine within the UK,
and the incredible growth rates of sales to wine producing countries such as Germany
and France, demonstrates an appreciation for U.S. wines within the EU.'0 The
burgeoning success of U.S. wine makers exporting their products into the EU
indicates this market may continue to provide lucrative opportunities in the future for
U.S. wine companies."
1. See Economic Research Service: Agricultural Income and Finance, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 13, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 15143562.
2. See L. Pierce Carson, Californla Wine Tasting Takes On International Flavor, NAPA VAuLEY REwSTR,
Oct. 3, 1993; see also The Wine World In Review, WINES &VINES, (July 1. 1997). available in 1997 WL 10177594
[hereinafter Wine World In Review].
3. See State to Seek Reciprocal Shipping For Wine, Liquor, LA. TIMES, Bus. & TECH., Nov. 21. 1997
(visited Nov. 23, 1997) <http'Jwww.latimes.com:80/CNS_DAYS/971121/t000105422.html>.
4. See James B. Clawson, et al., Wine Institute International Trade Barriers Report, at 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Wine Inst.]. (This is a study prepared and paid for by the Wine Institute. The Wine Institute is the trade association
that represents the interests of the California and the U.S. wine industry.)
5. See PHILIP RAWORTH, FOREIGN TRADE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1-2 (1995) (noting that the
European Union was established under the Maastricht Treaty on January 1, 1993, creating a single market for
European Community Member States, which include Ireland, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Spain,
Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Greece, plus subsequent to 1993, Finland, Sweden and
Austria became Member States); see also Maura K. McKelvey, Comment, Cheap Beer Or Economic Harmony:
With The Dissolution Of Import Barriers, Should Excise Duties In The EU Be "Harmonized" Also?, 18 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L REv. 457 (1995) (describing that on Jan. 1, 1993, the EU was established and created a single market),
6. See Wine World In Review, supra note 2.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.; see also Larry Walker, U.S. Wines Gained Again In 1996, WINES & VINES (July 1, 1997)
(explaining that this was an increase of nearly six percent over the previous year).
10. See Wine World in Review, supra note 2; see also Walker, supra note 9 (providing that Germany, France
and the United Kingdom were some of the leading markets for U.S. wine exports in the EU).
11. See Walker. supra note 9 (describing that sales for U.S. wine exports had increased during the years of
1994-1996, with 1997 becoming another strong year equating that this trend would continue in the future for U.S.
wines).
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Although the EU has been a highly advantageous market for U.S. wine makers
exporting their products, this process has not been without its difficulties.12 The EU
has a complex and multiple set of regulations outlining the marketing, exporting, and
selling of wine in the EU. United States wine exporters need to be aware of the
existing practices, regulations and laws which operate as trade barriers,13 making it
more difficult for U.S. wine companies to compete in the European market.
According to the Wine Institute, 4 the U.S. wine industry has three major areas
of concern regarding the process of exporting to the European Union. 5 First, the EU
has a discriminatory system of tariffs, internal taxes, and governmental subsidies that
impede the sales of wine imports.' 6 Second, the EU through licensing requirements,
labeling restrictions, marketing regulations, oenological"7 practices and certification
regulations' 8 inhibits the free circulation of wine for marketing and sales of imports
in the EU. Third, EU restrictions on the use of geographic names 9 of imported wines
constitute barriers to trade.20 It is estimated that if these three areas of trade barriers
were reduced or eliminated, the potential increase in sales of U.S. wine exports could
amount to an additional US$100-US$150 million.2'
The purpose of this Comment is to provide a basic framework of important
regulations, restrictions, and agreements a U.S. wine exporter should be aware of in
exporting their wine products to the EU.22 This Comment is divided into four major
parts. Part II describes and discusses the EU's unequal treatment of U.S. wines
through high tariffs, internal taxes, and government subsidies.23 Part III discusses the
12. See infra notes 31-253 and accompanying text.
13. Trade barriers or barriers to trade will be utilized in this Comment to denote any market impediment to
a wine company marketing, distributing or selling its wine products within a particular market.
14. See Wine Inst., supra note 4.
15. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 27-37 (listing these three categories as principles that are important
issues for the European and U.S. wine industries). Although this report lists four principles which are the free
circulation of goods, equal treatment, mutual recognition, or geographic indications and administrative
collaboration, this Comment will only address these first three principles as separate areas. However, this Comment
will include the principle of administrative collaboration within these three sections. This report provides a good
overview and starting point of the EU trade barriers affecting U.S. wines. Id.
16. See id. at 31.
17. See WEBmSTER'S DICTIONARY 754 (3d ed. 1986) (defining "oenology" as the study of wines and wine
making).
18. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 27, 30.
19. See Jim Chen, A Sober Look At Appellations of Origin: How The United States Will Crash France's
Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29, 31 (1997) (providing the definition for geographic names
or "Appellations of Origin," that are defined by the French governme-nt as the designation of a country, of a region,
or of a locality that serves to indicate that a product originates from that place and owes its quality or characteristics
to its geographic surroundings).
20. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 34 (listing geographic indications as a trade barrier); see also Chen,
supra note 19, at 29 (proposing that only those wines produced according to these rules regarding Appellations of
Origin may be legally marketed under the geographically significant appellation of origin); see also infra notes 223-
53 and accompanying text.
21. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 27.
22. Although this Comment does not purport to be a complete guide to EU regulations, laws, restrictions,
and trade barriers with regard to exporting wine into the EU, it should provide a starting point and overview of EU
laws regarding exporting and marketing wine within the EU.
23. See infra notes 28-106 and accompanying text.
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various administrative and technical regulations considered by the industry as
barriers to the free circulation of wine products.u Part IV examines the geographic
name restrictions imposed on wines imported into the EU that constitute barriers to
trade.' 5 Part V addresses the two alternative means to reduce trade barriers of wines
exported into the EU.2 Finally, Part VI concludes that although the EU will remain
a lucrative market for U.S. wine, the United States should actively seek increased
access and fairer treatment for U.S. wine makers exporting to the EUY
II. TARIFFS, INTERNAL TAXES AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
EU wine makers seeking to export wine into the United States will find a
relatively open market.' The United States provides a more open market than the EU
by imposing fewer trade restrictions and barriers on wine imports?2 In stark contrast,
U.S. wine companies exporting to the EU will discover that the EU is more pro-
tective than the United States of its wine industry, imposing barriers to wine imports
through higher tariffs, internal taxes, and governmental subsidieso
A. Tariffs
The EU possesses a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) system3' which is com-
prised of all the tariff measures that affect imports into the EU.32 Under the CCT,
rates are determined by the alcohol strength of the wine, container size, and wine
type.33 The EU maintains tariff rates on imported wine that are significantly higher
than the United States. 4 European Union tariffs on imported wine range from 15.7
24. See infra notes 107-222 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 223-53 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 254-317 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 318-21 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 31-43 & 126-69 and accompanying text (examining that the United States imposes fewer
tariffs and fewer restrictions on the labeling and marketing of imported wine than does the EU).
29. See infra notes 28-222 and accompanying text (discussing that the United States imposes lower tariff
rates and provides less subsidies to its wine industry than the EU).
30. See infra notes 28-222 and accompanying text.
31. See Raworth, supra note 5, at 5 (1995) (defining the Common Customs Tariff as all "the tariff measures
affecting imports into the EU at any particular time").
32. See id.
33. See Jennie E. Wilson, U.S. Wine Exporters Cheer Expanding U.K. Market, AGExporter, U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Aug. 1. 1997, available in 1997 WL 10881333 (basing these rates on 1997 figures).
34. See id; see also Harmonized Tariff Schedule, HTS 2204.21.20- 2204.21.80, USITC Trade Database
(visited Feb. 7, 1998) <http:1205.197.120.17/scriptslisttd.asp> (listing the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule for
the wine items of 2204.21.20.2204.21.80); see also Economic Research Service, International Agriculture and
Trade, M2 PREsswnE, Jan. 8, 1998, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File (claiming that EU imports
include specialty products such as alcoholic beverages that are subject to high tariffs); see also Commission
Regulation 2086/97, ch. 22, 1997 O.J. (L 312) (providing the tariff rate for wine subheadings 2204.21.10-
2204.21.80).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 11
cents per liter to 50.8 cents per liter, while U.S. tariffs only range from a mere 9.9
cents per liter to 30.9 cents per liter.35
The United States has committed itself to a thirty-six percent reduction of its
wine tariffs over six years by signing and ratifying the trade agreements concluded
in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATI).36 The EU maintains that it will also reduce its tariffs on
imported wine by thirty-six percent in accordance with the Uruguay Round GAIT 7
The EU has complied with the Uruguay Round of GATT by enacting policies
to reduce the EU's Common Customs Tariff of imported wines from third
countries." However, even with these reductions, an enormous disparity in tariff
rates between the United States and the EU remains.3 9 EU tariff rates are a colossal
fifty-eight percent to sixty-three percent higher than U.S. tariff rates.o Maintaining
higher tariff rates within the EU places U.S. wine companies at a disadvantage
against EU wine companies competing for international market share.
The EU is complying with the present conditions under the Uruguay Agree-
ments, so the United States has no valid case against the EU under the World Trade
Organization (WTO).41 Furthermore, the U.S.'s only option to level the playing field
with the EU and its tariff policy is to obtain further tariff reduction rates through
bilateral agreements.4 2 This should be one of the items the United States should
address in a trade agreement with the EU. 43
35. 'Cents' refers to U.S. currency. See Harmonized Tariff Schedule, supra note 34. See also Wilson, supra
note 33; see also Commission Regulation 2086/97, ch. 22, 1997 OJ. (L 312) (wine subheadings 2204.21.10-
2204.21.80).
36. See 19 U.S.C. § 3511 (1997) (approving and entering into force the Uruguay Round Agreements); see
also Agreement On Agriculture, art. 1(f), Final Texts Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive
Office of the President, Final Texts of the GAIT Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in
FRANK W. SWACKER, Er AL., MuLTATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING 33-59 (1996) [hereinafter Agreement On Agriculture] (explaining that the agreements of the
Uruguay Round GATT are to take effect, commencing in 1995 for each contracting party of the agreement); id.
(recognizing that these tariff reductions are to be instituted by the contracting parties of the Uruguay Round GAT
agreements during the six year period of 1995-2000); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 27; see also RALPH H.
FoLsoM & MtCHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATiONAL BuswNrss TRANSACTIONS, §8.10 (Ist ed. 1995).
37. See generally Body of Council Regulation 3290/94, 1994 OJ. (L 349) (providing the EU rates of
customs duty applicable to agricultural products will be instituted in accordance with the Uruguay Round of GAIT
for products such as wine); see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 36; see also Wine Inst., supra note 4,
at 31.
38. See Commission Regulation 1482/95, 1995 OJ. (L 145); see also Council Regulation 3290/94, 1994
OJ. (L 349); see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 36.
39. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. As stated previously in the text, EU tariffs range from
15.7 cents per liter to 50.8 cents per liter, while U.S. tariffs only range from a mere 9.9 cents per liter to 30.9 cents
per liter. See also Harmonized Tariff Schedule, supra note 34. See also Wilson, supra note 33; see also Commission
Regulation 2086/97, ch. 22, 1997 OJ. (L 312) (wine subheadings 2204.21.10- 2204.21.80). When one calculates
these numbers, one will find that the EU tariff rates are 58% to 63% higher than U.S. tariff rates.
41. See infra note 255 and accompanying text (discussing the World Trade Organization); see also
Agreement ofAgriculture, supra note 36.
42. See infra note 255 and accompanying text; see also Agreement ofAgriculture, supra note 36.
43. See infra note 255 and accompanying text; see also Agreement ofAgriculture, supra note 36.
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B. Internal Taxes
Internal taxes function as a trade barrier to wine importers within the EU."
Internal taxes consist of an individual Member State's45 excise and Value Added
Taxes (VAT). 6 On January 1, 1993, the European Commission of the European
Economic Community47 established minimum excise duty rates for alcoholic
beverages, including wine. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, each Member
State levied excise duties based on the weight or volume of wine with no minimum
excise duty rates.49 The Economic and Finance Council for the EU adopted Directive
92/84 on October 19, 1992, which deals specifically with the excise duty rates levied
on alcoholic beverages and the alcohol contained in other productse According to
this directive, the excise duties in the Member States for wine must exceed the
minimum level required, unless a Member State is given an express exception by
subsequent EU legislation.5'
However, these directives only established minimum excise duties on wine!2
Each individual country within the EU also imposes taxes on wine through VATs as
well as the mandated minimum excise taxes.53 Moreover, the tax systems of the
Member States within the EU are still fairly diverse.m Even though the European
Union is currently in the process of creating a more uniform system of excise and
VATs for each individual state, these taxes make it more expensive to import wine
44. See Julia Irvine, UK: The Drinks Are On The Chancellor-Alcoholic Duties, REUTER TEXTLINE
AcCouNTANcY, Apr. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECNews File.
45. See Raworth, supra note 5, at 2. Individual Member State refers to a member of the European Union.
Id
46. See Irvine, supra note 44.
47. See Raworth, supra note 5, at 1-2 (providing the European Economic Community was the predecessor
of the European Union). The European Economic Community was also called the European Community. Id. Today,
the EU is referred to as the EC too. Id. Legislation that was enacted under the EEC or EC is carried over and is
applicable to the EU. Id.
48. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 457; see also CooPERs & LYBRAND, EC Commentaries, Excise Duties
and Other Indirect Taxes, Section 2 (Mar. 14, 1994); see also Council Directive 92/83, 1992 OJ. (L 316); see also
Council Directive 92/84, 1992 OJ. (L 316).
49. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 460; see also COOPERS &LYBRAND, supra note 48, §1.
50. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 461; see also Council Directive 92/84,1992 OJ. (L 316) (providing the
approximation of the rates of the excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages).
51. See McKelvey, supra note 5. at 461; see also Council Directive 92/84, 1992 OJ. (L 316).
52. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 461; see also Council Directive 92/84, 1992 OJ. (L 316).
53. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 461; see also Council Directive 92/84, 1992 OJ. (L 316); see also
Irvine, supra note 44. For example the excise duty rate for table wine in the UK is $1.69, or 1.01 pound sterling
per standard bottle, Denmark's excise duty rate for table wine is $0.85 or .0.51p, and Ireland's excise duty rate for
table wine is $2.72 or 1.63 pound sterling per standard bottle. Id.; see also Your Guide To The Latest Exchange
Rates, Online Design NetTrack, On-Line Scotland, (visited Jan. 19, 1998) <http://www.pcug.cu.uk/
-esc/gen/enerall.html> (providing the currency exchange rate on January 17, 1998).
54. See Irvine, supra note 44; see also Your Guide To The Latest Exchange Rates, Online Design NetTrack,
On-Line Scotland, (visited Jan. 19, 1998) <http'//www.pcug.cu.uk/-.esc/gen/generall.htn-l> (providing the currency
exchange rate on January 17, 1998). See also McKelvey, supra note 5, at 462.
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into many countries of the EU.55 The diversity of these taxes among EU Member
States distorts the potential for sales among individual Member States within the
EU.m The more money a bottle of wine commands in a particular Member State, the
less chance a consumer there has to purchase that bottle because of its internal taxY
This, in turn, inhibits the wine company's ability to market its product in the EU.
58
Therefore, these differences in internal taxes convolute sales among several EU
countries.5 9 The more uniform these taxes, the greater the opportunity a seller has to
maximize sales in all the EU countries equally.6
Internal taxes imposed by the individual Member States appear to impose the
least amount of trade barriers to importers. These duties apply equally to all wine
products, including EU wines.6' Furthermore, these internal taxes, although a trade
burden to U.S. wines, are equally burdensome on EU wines.
The United States can attempt through international negotiations to have these
rates lowered. However, lower rates may be pragmatically difficult to realize,
because individual countries have the right to set their internal tax rate as long as they
are in compliance with the directives on minimum excise duty rates.62 The EU is in
the process of making these internal taxes more uniform within the EU, but some
members of the EU Commission hold the opinion that a uniform system cannot be
established before the adoption of the single EU currency.63 The various concerns
and issues among the interested EU Member States is why the harmonization of
55. See Irvine, supra note 44 (asserting that when alcohol excise duties are lowered, it makes it less
expensive for a consumer to buy alcohol products, which in fact, increases the sales of the alcohol products). This
supports the proposition that the higher the excise duties are, the more expensive products are because of the tax.
Id. Thus, if the product is more expensive to buy, this affects all sellers as well as importers. Id.
56. See CooPERs & LYBRAND, supra note 48, §1; see also McKelvey, supra note 5, at 457 (asserting that
the Individual Member States still maintain their own internal systems of taxation, causing distortions in production
costs and prices, and ultimately in the conditions of competition).
57. See Irvine, supra note 44 (discussing that the higher the excise taxes are, the more expensive the
products are which decrease the demand for these products). Therefore, higher excise taxes make it more difficult
for a company, including a wine company, to sell their products within the market of the country that imposes
higher taxes on products. See id.
58. See id.
59. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
60. See generally McKelvey, supra note 5, at 464-65 (describing how consumers in the EU cross the various
member state borders for the reason of purchasing alcoholic products at less expensive rates than their country of
origin because of the disparity of excise tax rates among the Member States). The Member States with the lower
excise taxes attract foreign consumers from other Member States to buy particular beer and wine products in the
Member States with lower excise taxes. Id. It follows from these trends that if these excise taxes were more
uniform, then each member state would have the equal ability to sell the beer or wine to their native consumers
without their citizens desiring to travel to another member state to obtain the product. L at 470.
61. See generally Irvine, supra note 44 (discussing and listing the duty rates of the various EU countries,
which applies to all wines, and not just imported wines).
62. See Council Directive 92/84, 1992 OJ. (L 316).
63. See VATExcise Duties: Uncertainty And Impatience Over Commission Proposals, EUR. INM. SERV.,
EUR. Rnr., Nov. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ecnews File (stating that insiders within the EU
Commission on Taxes are convinced that the definitive regime cannot be established before the introduction of the
single currency, if then).
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excise duties is taking such a long time to enact." Therefore, U.S. wine companies
can only do the undesirable act of waiting for the EU to adopt a uniform system of
internal taxes, then attempt to establish a bilateral agreement with the EU regarding
these rates to reduce the prices of wine within the EU."
C. Government Subsidies
Government subsidies for the wine industry has been a highly disputed issue
between the EU and United States." Unlike the United States, the EU provides
massive outlays of government subsidies to its wine industry.67 In 1996, the EU
commission allocated US$1.8 billion to subsidize its wine industry.0 These subsidies
consist of funding support for exporting costs, and for production and non-
production69 of wine.70 In addition, the EU provides internal support to the wine
sector including distillation intervention, 1 storage aids, and vineyard restructuring
support.73 Finally, promotional funding is available through the individual wine
producing states. 4
64. See id. (stating that harmonization of excise duties dates back only to 1993 and the necessary
compromise was obtained only with great difficulty, therefore the Commission decided not to aim for overly
ambitious and unrealistic goals, but to concentrate on the problems created by this harmonization, and by all
interested parties regarding their specific needs).
65. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (addressing the fact that the process of the EU developing
a uniform system of excise duties may be lengthy). Thus, it can be inferred that it would be wiser for the United
States to wait for the adoption of a uniform system of excise taxes within the EU before seeking reductions, because
the United States first has to have knowledge of what these excise tax rates will be before they can seek an
agreement with the EU to reduce them.
66. See Agricultural Outlook, M2 PRESSWMRF, July 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL 19940879 [hereinafter
Agricultural Outlook] (asserting that the U.S. wine industry is concerned about foreign markets, notably the EU,
continuing to use barriers, including subsidies against trade).
67. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 31; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also Sour Grapes,
ECONOMIST, June 25, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12756105.
68. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 31; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also Sour Grapes,
supra note 67.
69. See JOHN A. USHER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POuCY AFTER 1992: THE LEOAL
DIMENSION 144 (Marc Maresceau, ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) (providing that the EU Member States
provide subsidies to its wine companies from limiting or not producing wine as the United States does for its
farmers).
70. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 32; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66.
71. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WINE 327 (Jancis Robinson, ed., 1994) [hereinafter OXFORD
COMPANION] (providing that distillation intervention is support for distillation which is the separation of the
constituents of a liquid mixture but partial vaporation of the mixture and the separate recovery of the vapor and the
residue).
72. See OxFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 925 (stating that a Storage aid is assistance from the EU to
various wine makers in the storage of wine which consists of consigning the bottles to professional storage or to
establish some form of private cellar).
73. See Spain: Annual Wine Report, U.S. Dept. of Agric. Rpts., American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, Nov.
19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 15980545 (maintaining that vineyard restructuring support is government
assistance for the growing and harvesting of wine).
74. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 32; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66 (providing that the
Italian government provided $12.3 million for the promotion of Italian wine exports, and the French government
provided $7.5 million for the promotion of French wine exports).
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Countries generally justify the use of subsidies and other government support for
its agricultural products to maintain a system of self-sufficiency in food and
beverages.75 The EU asserts that self-sufficiency, by a system of government support,
provides an EU country with a national independence of food security.7 6 A country
with food security has independence and does not have to rely on other countries,
thereby giving it international political power.!
Wine is protected as an agricultural product under the justification of national
self-sufficiency and food security. However, the EU is being disingenuous by
classifying wine as a food or beverage product for food security! 9 Thus, it may be
true that EU government support for wine provides the EU self-sufficiency for the
product itself, however, the product of wine itself is not a food or beverage item that
is necessary to a nation's survival such as the product of milk or bread.* Moreover,
wine is actually a luxury and not an essential agricultural product for food security
of a country.8t
EU support for its wine industry goes beyond a desire for self-sufficiency and
security. 2 The EU, especially France, is immensely protective of its wine industry
75. See Jeffrey J. Steinle, Comment, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for Agriculture,
4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 335 (1995) (stating that "many countries aim to achieve self-sufficiency in
agricultural products").
76. See id. at 335-36 (discussing the idea that in order to preserve national independence, governments
subsidize agriculture beyond the level necessary to meet food needs and encourage growth in the agricultural base,
resulting in food security and independence); see also Economic Research Service, International Agriculture and
Trade, supra note 34 (providing that products such as bread, milk, meat, and eggs provide a nation with food
security).
77. See Steinle, supra note 75, at 335 (arguing that subsidies and other government support of agriculture
are necessary because the ability to withhold food from a dependent country can create a significant political
advantage). A food embargo, for example can detrimentally affect a country during war. Id. Even outside of war,
economic sanctions, including those that restrict food supplies, have been used to address human rights abuses and
dissuade countries from pursuing military goals. Id.
78. Wine is universally classified as an agricultural product. See Agriculture: EU Has Done Well Out Of
GA7TAgreement, Says Steichen, EUR. INFO. SERV., EUR. RPT., Nov. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Ecnews File [hereinafter EU Has Done Well]; see also France: Annual Situation Report, U.S. Department of
Agriculture Reports, American Embassy, Paris, Oct. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12492120 (listing wine as an
agricultural product). Thus, wine as an agricultural product is protected by the EU under the justification of national
self-sufficiency and food security. Steinle, supra note 75, at 335.
79. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (addressing the disingenuousness of the EU maintaining
enormous amounts of subsidies and governmental support under the justification of self-sufficiency and food
security, when wine is actually considered a luxury item).
80. See THEWORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, Vol. 7, at 461, Vol. 10, at 503, Vol. 18, at 738 (Dale W. Jacobs
et al. eds., 1996) (notwithstanding any uses for religious purposes, the major wine producing and consuming nations
of France, Italy and Spain are primarily Roman Catholic); see also JOHN A. HARDoN, SJ., THE CATHOuC
CATECHISM 462 (1981) (stating that wine is an essential part of a Catholic Mass because Catholics believe that the
wine is transubstantiated into the Blood of Christ, which Catholics then drink during the mass).
81. See THE WoRLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDiA, Vol. 21, at 338 (Dale W. Jacobs et al. eds., 1996) (providing
that wine is viewed as a product to enhance meals or the dining-out process).
82. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (deducing that the EU provides excessive support for its
wine industry to protect the esteemed and successful product of wine, rather than maintaining self-sufficiency for
a product that is necessary to a nation's food security).
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through subsidies and other internal support, for cultural and political reasons. Wine
is a highly popular and commonly consumed beverage within the EU.8 The long
history and success of EU wines in the world market provide an incentive for EU
wine producing countries, notably France, to maintain the success for this highly
revered and prestigious industry.85 Accordingly, the EU attempts to preserve the
success of its wine industry through subsidies and other government support."
The U.S. government does not provide subsidies for its wine industry.87 United
States government support for its wine industry consists of funding for promotional
programs.88 These U.S. government promotional subsidies constituted US$4.5
million, a mere two percent of the subsidies provided by the EU to its wine makers.89
The United States has not provided an abundant amount of internal support for its
wine industry because wine is not a culturally revered product as it is in Europe.9°
Consequently, the United States provides less internal support for its wine industry
than does the EU.
Wine originates from the vintification of grapes, therefore, wine is universally
categorized as an agricultural product.91 Many nations, such as the United States,
were concerned with the consequence that agricultural subsidies were a burden to
global trade.92 Therefore, agriculture received great attention and focus at the
Uruguay Round of GATT.93 Hence, the Agreement of Agriculture was written and
adopted to reduce internal support and export subsidies for agriculture." The EU,
under the Agreement of Agriculture, will cut internal support for wine by twenty
83. See William Drozdiak, Where Napa's A Dirty Word France Is Bottleneck for California Wines, WASH.
POST, July 5, 1995 (addressing the issue that France becomes silent during the general discussions about the need
to break down trade barriers and open up the global marketplace when it comes to the most chauvinistic of
beverages-wine). As French vineyards struggle with ballooning labor costs and heavy property taxes, the high
quality and low cost of foreign wine from the United States and other countries threaten to overwhelm a sector that
has served as a pillar of French civilization. Id., see also French Winegrowers Protest Against New Farm Deal,
FOOD & DRINK DALY, Dec. 13, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2791089 (discussing the 5000 French winegrowers
who demonstrated against a reworked Agreement of Agriculture at the Uruguay Round of GATr manifests political
support for government wine programs).
84. See Wine World In Review, supra note 2.
85. See Drozdiak, supra note 83.
86. See id.
87. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
88. See k
89. See id.
90. See Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66 (proposing that U.S. consumers only began drinking wine in
mass in the early 1990's because of news about the health benefits of moderate consumption, and because a strong
U.S. economy supported increased spending on wine at home and in restaurants).
91. See EU Has Done Well, supra note 78; see also France: Annual Situation Report, supra note 78 (listing
wine as an agricultural product).
92. See Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS, AGREEMENT ON
AGRICULTURE, OFFCE OFTHE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUIVE OFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS ACT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, Sept. 27, 1994, available in 1994 WL 761603
[hereinafter AGRICULTURE STATEMENT] (stating that subsidies and other market-distorting practices limit U.S.
agricultural exports to markets around the world); see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 36.
93. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 36.
94. See id.; see also supra note 36.
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percent and export subsidies by thirty-six percent. 95 On the surface, it appears that the
United States has gained some major ground in reducing EU trade barriers
6
Unfortunately, after these reductions, there will still be a tremendous gap
between the amount that the EU allocates for its wine sector and what the United
States allocates for the same.97 This disparity between the United States and the
European Union in providing government subsidies for wine makes it extremely
difficult for U.S. wine companies to compete with the EU wine makers in the
European market.98 EU support for its wine companies creates an advantage by
enabling the companies to save on costs and sell their products at lower prices due
to the internal support and subsidies?9
Based on the above-mentioned figures of government subsidies and internal
support, it appears that the EU is not providing an equal playing field for imported
wine from the United States. The government support issue poses a unique and
challenging dilemma for the United Statest'0 The Agreement of Agriculture was
established to lower these support programs for all the applicable agricultural
products, and not just wine.'0 ' When analyzing the U.S. agriculture section as a
whole, the United States provides massive support for this economic sector as does
the EU.t° Hence, when the Agreement of Agriculture was made, both the EU and
the United States were bargaining for a reduction in support for the entire agricultural
section as a whole.'03 Even though the Agreement of Agriculture is beneficial to
agriculture in general, the enormous differences between EU and U.S. support
95. See EU ffhas Done Well, supra note 78; see also Agreement On Agriculture, supra note 36.
96. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 36 (meaning that the Agreement on Agriculture will reduce
the subsidies and other market-distorting practices). It also strengthens multilateral rules for trade in agricultural
products and requires WTO members to reduce protection against trade distorting domestic support programs, and
export subsidies. See id.
97. There will remain a tremendous gap between the amount that the United States will allocate to its wine
industry and what the EU will allocate for the same based on the fact that the U.S. will reduce its internal support
for wine of US$4.5 million by 20-36%, while the EU will reduce its internal support for wine 20%-36% from
US$1.8 billion. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 31; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also Sour
Grapes, ECONOMIST, June 25, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12756105; see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra
note 36. Therefore, there will remain a huge disparity between the amount that the EU will continue to support its
wine industry versus the contrasting smaller amount that the United States will provide for its wine sector. See id.
98. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 31; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also Sour Grapes,
ECONOMIST, June 25, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12756105; see also Spain: Annual Wine Report, supra note 73;
see also Steinle, supra note 75, at 338.
99. See Spain: Annual Wine Report, supra note 73; see also Steinle, supra note 75, at 338 (emphasizing that
if a country is able to maintain more of its protectionist policies than other nations, then it stands to gain
dramatically through increased exports and can raise or lower prices accordingly).
100. See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (discussing that the government support issue poses a
challenge to the United States because the Agreement of Agriculture did not have much of an effect of equalizing
the amounts of government support for the wine industry itself as between the EU and the U.S.).
101. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 36, art. 21, annex 1.
102. See Steinle, supra note 75, at 340 (citing BUDGErOF THE U.S. GovT, HISTORICAL TABLEs 40-42 (1995).
This comment asserts that the U.S. averaged US$20 billion in expenditures per year for the previous ten year period
on agricultural programs. Id The EEC spent $36 billion for agricultural products. Id. at 340, n.38.
103. See EU Has Done Well, supra note 78; see also Agreement On Agriculture, supra note 36.
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programs for the wine industry have created an enormous windfall for the EU wine
companies.'0 4
The United States, as with the tariff issue, should actively pursue the reduction
of these trade barriers through future bilateral agreements with the EU regarding
wine itself.05 Alternatively, the United States could enter into a separate bilateral
agreement concerning wine with the EU in order to decrease the unequal support
programs for the EU wine companies. 06
ll. F REE CIRCULATION OF GOODS
In addition to tariffs, internal taxes, and subsidies, the European Union imposes
various administrative and technical regulations considered by the industry as bar-
riers to the free circulation of goods. °7 These barriers include: (1) licensing regu-
lations,'06 (2) labeling restrictions,'09 (3) marketing regulations,"0 (4) regulations on
oenological practices,"' and (5) certification regulations."'
A. Licensing Regulations
The EU, through Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3388/81 of November 27,
1981, established detailed rules with respect to import licenses in the wine sector."
3
Article 1 of 3388/81 requires all wine imports into the Community shall be subject
to the production of an import license." 4 This regulation requires all wine importers
obtain a license before their wine can be imported into the EU.'s Among other
things," 6 the following information is required for the license: the country of origin
104. A windfall has been created for EU wine companies because there will still be an enormous gap between
EU and U.S. expenditures of government support for wine with the Agreement of Agriculture. See Wine Inst., supra
note 4, at 31; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also Sour Grapes, supra note 67 ; see also Spain:
Annual Wine Report, supra note 73; see also Steinle, supra note 75, at 338; see also Agreement on Agriculture,
supra note 36.
105. See infra notes 297-306 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 297-306 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 108-222 and accompanying text (describing licensing regulations, labeling restrictions,
marketing regulations, regulations on oenological practices and certification regulations as trade barriers to the free
flow of wine within the EU for importers).
108. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 170-204 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 205-22 and accompanying text.
113. See Commission Regulation 3388/81, 1981 OJ. (L 341).
114. See id.
115. See .
116. See generally id. (listing other requirements such as the country of destination, the type of vine for
special wines, concentrated grape juice amounts, etc.).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 11
of the wine producer, color of wine, tariff subheadings,"1 7 and product descriptions.!"
Finally, licenses shall be valid from the date of issue until the end of the fourth month
following the day of issue."'
Nations participating in the Uruguay Round of GATT recognized that the flow
of international trade could be impeded by the inappropriate use of import licensing
procedures." To counter this trade barrier, the participating members of the Uruguay
Round of GATT adopted the Agreement On Import Licensing Procedures.21 The
Agreement restricts nations from facilitating unreasonable licensing requirements."
The EU has enacted policies to comply with the Agreement.'2
Even though this regulation appears to be a "de minimis" burden on a wine
company exporting to the EU market, it nevertheless is a trade barrier."z A wine
company may not export its wine product until the company has been issued a
license by the EU.'2' Therefore, a wine maker should be prepared to comply with the
EU licensing requirements before exporting to the EU.
B. Labeling Regulations
The labeling requirements that the EU imposes on imported wine has been a
contentious issue between the U.S. and the EU.'" The EU imposes strict labeling
requirements and the U.S. has not been successful in harmonizing labeling
regulations with the EU.127 The United States Trade Representative28 listed these
regulations imposed on imported wines as trade barriers to the free flow of goods
117. See id. (requiring the subheadings for the tariff items of products made from concentrated grape juice
and grape must, unconcentrated grape juice and grape must, and wine of fresh grapes).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Introduction of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Executive Office of the President, FINAL TEXTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, Apr. 15,
1994, reprinted in FRANK W. SWACKER, ET AL., 231-238 (1996).
121. See id.
122. See id. at Art. 1(3) (mandating that the rules for import licensing procedures be neutral in application
and administered in a fair and equitable manner).
123. See Commission Regulation 1351/97, 1997 OJ. (L 186) (mentioning that the EU is ensuring better
administration of the license scheme imposed by the GAIT agreements).
124. With the Agreement of Import Licensing Procedures, which regulates that import licensing procedures
be neutral in application and administered fairly, an import license which is a standard item for compliance for all
importers makes import licensing procedures a "de minimis" burden. See Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures, supra note 120.
125. See Wilson, supra note 33.
126. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (addressing the issue of EU labeling regulations and that
these regulations are listed as barriers to trade).
127. See Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990
OJ. (L 309) (stating wine must conform in description and presentation according to EU regulations); see also EU:
EU/United States-Barrier of American Goods, RETER TExTuNE AGENcEE uR., Apr. 19,1997, available in LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, Eenews File [hereinafter Barrier of American Goods] (discussing labeling as a trade barrier that the
U.S. Trade Representative lists as a remaining area of difficulty for U.S. exporters).
128. The USTR is the person who has "primary responsibility for developing, and coordinating the
implementation of U.S. international trade policy." 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1998).
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within the EU.'29 The labeling requirements the EU imposes on wine are found in
Council Regulations 2392/89,' 30 3201/90,131 and the numerous amendments to these
regulations.
Articles 25, 26, and 27 of Council Regulation 2392/89 provide the permissible
and required labeling requirements for imported wines. 32 This regulation draws a
distinction in its treatment of what information is required and limited on wine
labeling between imported wines described by reference to a geographic area and
imported wines that are not described by reference to a geographic area. Under
Council Regulation 2392/89, all wine imports for retail sale must carry the labels in
the language of importing country and provide the following information: bottler's
name and address; name of the region where the grapes were grown; quality
category, such as table wine, quality wine or quality wine with special attributes such
as Cabernet; quality control number which has been previously issued by the state
grading agency; and, alcohol content and net volume in metric units)
34
In addition to the regulations and restrictions imposed by Council Regulation
2392/89, the EU enacted more regulations and restrictions through Commission
Regulation 3201/90, which provides the detailed rules for the description and
presentation of wines.3 5 Moreover, a wine importer must also be aware of, and
comply with, all the regulations and restrictions imposed by the amendments to these
Council regulations.' 36 This process can be very time consuming for a wine company
to have to read through in order to comply with EU requirements. 37
There are hundreds of pages of regulations applicable to the wine trade imposed
on U.S. wine companies by the EU, while the U.S. labeling regulations by contrast,
equal only eleven pages in length. 38 In addition, the EU's regulations are composed
129. See Barrier of American Goods, supra note 127 (asserting the different labeling procedures used by EU
Member States serve as barriers to the free movement of products within the EU and can cause lengthy delays in
sales).
130. See generally Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232) (laying down the general rules for the
description and presentation of wines and grape musts in the EU).
131. See generally Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309) (providing and laying down the
detailed rules for the description and presentation of wines and grape musts in the EU).
132. See generally Council Regulation 2392/89, arts. 25, 26 & 27, 1989 OJ. (L 232) (mandating the only
information allowed on labels of non-EU wines).
133. See Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232).
134. See id; see also Germany Samples the Pleasure of U.S. Wines, AGEXPORTER, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC.,
Aug. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10881334 (listing these six general requirements for labels to qualify for
importation into the EU).
135. See Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232). See also generally Commission Regulation
3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309) (providing detailed rules such as the size of the smallest letters of outer packaging being
no more than 3 mm high, if the nominal volume of the container is less than 20 c; no more than 5 nun high, if the
nominal volume of the container is 20 cl or more but not more than 100 c; or no more than 6 nun high, if the
nominal volume of the container is more than 100 cl ).
136. See also Council Regulation 1472/97, 1997 OJ. (L 200) (amending Commission Regulation 3201/90).
137. See Barrier of American Goods, supra note 127.
138. See generally Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ.(L 232); see also generally Commission Regulation
3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Council Regulation 1472/97, 1997 OJ. (L 200) (amending Commission
Regulation 3201/90 and providing that certain terms used for geographic descriptions used to designate wine
imported from a third country such as "wines originating in the Republic of Hungary," must in particular be shown
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in a manner where every item regarding requirements of wine labels is detailed.'39
In contrast, the United States only provides in its regulations of wine labels, items
that are either prohibited or mandatory.': 4 Furthermore, although these regulations
are uniform within the individual EU states, local customs officials have the ability
to interpret and enforce these regulations.14' This method utilized by the EU of
interpreting and enforcing the regulations, makes it cumbersome and expensive for
U.S. wine companies to conform to the local customs officials interpretations. 42
Therefore, these heavy labeling regulations burden wine imports to the EU.
C. Marketing Regulations
The EU also imposes marketing restrictions on imported wine. 43 For example,
the EU has prevented the terms "table wine" and "reserve" from appearing on non-
EU wine.' 44 The term "table wine" in Europe is known by ordinary wine drinkers as
a type that is consumed with everyday meals. 45 This restriction makes it extremely
difficult for U.S. wine producers to market their wine as "dinner wine." Incidently,
dinner wine is the largest selling type of wine in Europe.'4 These types of trade
barriers by the EU on imported wines are excessive and extremely burdensome for
U.S. wine makers. 47
Another term prohibited from appearing on wine labels of non-EU wine is
"reserve. ' t48 The EU itself does not have any specific regulations against importers
using the term "reserve."' 49 However, the EU follows and implements the restrictions
on the label of the imported wine in such a way that they are clearly distinguishable from the other information);
see also Labeling Requirements For Wine, 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.30-4.39 (1998).
139. See Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990
OJ. (L 309).
140. See Labeling Requirements For Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.30-4.39 (1998).
141. See Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990
OJ. (L 309). See also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28 (explaining although the labeling requirements are the same
for all EU member countries, local customs officials interpret and enforce these requirements subjectively making
labeling requirements quite expensive for U.S. producers wishing to export to the EU).
142. See Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. L 232; see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ.
(L 309); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
143. See Council Regulation 2392/89, art. 2, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Commission Regulation 3201/90,
1990 OJ. (L 309).
144. See Council Regulation 2392/89, art. 2, 1989 OJ. (L 232) (providing that the words "table wine" may
be used on EU labels); see also id. art. 25 (failing to list the term "table wine" as a permitted description of an
imported wine); see also generally Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309) (permitting only EU nations
to use the term reserve on wine labels).
145. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28 (addressing the issue of the EU prohibiting the term "table wine" on
non-EU wine making it difficult for U.S. wine producers to market their wine as dinner wine, the largest
consumption category for wine); see also Council Regulation 2392189, 1989 OJ. (L 232).
146. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28; see also Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232).
147. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28 (asserting that marketing restrictions on imported wines imposed by
the EU are excessively burdensome to U.S. wine companies).
148. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
149. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28
(providing for only EU Member States to use the term "reserve" on their labels).
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of individual Member States in using the term for the labeling on non-EU wine. 50
The term "reserve" is recognized by the EU as either fitting within the French
definition of a wine of superior quality or the Spanish interpretation of reserve as a
wine from barrel aging.' 5' The European Union requires that non-EU countries that
use these marketing terms on wine exported to the EU be required to establish and
utilize their own terms.'52 These regulations effectively bar U.S. wine companies
from using terms like "reserve," on their wines that are shipped to be sold in the
EU. 53 This has proven to be detrimental to U.S. wine companies because the use of
the term "reserve" is an extremely valuable marketing tool for selling wine
products.'T m
In the United States, marketing restrictions are regulated by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). 55 The ATF regulations do not provide a
definition for quality terms such as "reserve" for wine labels, either for wines that are
imported or produced within the United States.'5 The ATF defines table wine as
grape wine with an alcohol content not exceeding fourteen percent by volume.
5 7
United States regulations on the use of quality terms on wine sold in the United
States are less burdensome than the regulations imposed by the EU for non-European
wines sold in the EU.
58
Moreover, the EU also imposes other marketing regulations on imported wines.
First, all wines bottled for importation into the European Union must carry a "lot
mark" 59 so the EU can determine how to classify the wine. 6"o The package can
possess any coding system except bar codes for use as a lot mark, as long as the mark
150. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28; see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309) (stating
for example, for the purposes of imported wines no expression of certain terms concerning superior quality as
referred to in Article 26 (2) of Council Regulation 2392/89, may be translated into German).
151. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28
(addressing the fact that currently, the EU definition of reserve either denotes the French interpretation of superior
quality or the Spanish definition of barrel aging). Barrel aging is the storage of wine in barrels for aging. See BOOK
OF CALIFORNLA WINE 186 (Doris Muscatine, Maynard A. Amerine & Bob Thompson eds. 1984) [hereinafter BOOK
OFCAUFORNIA WINE].
152. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
153. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 O.J. (L 309); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
154. See BOOK OF CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 328 (explaining that terms such as reserve and
private reserve have value because they axe utilized by some wineries to distinguish a particular type of wine).
Thus, if a valuable marketing tool is restricted or prohibited, then there is a detriment to a wine seller.
155. See 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1997) (labeling); see also 27 U.S.C. § 205(0 (1997) (advertising): see also
Labeling Requirements for Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1998); see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66.
156. See 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1997) (labeling); see also 27 U.S.C. § 205(0 (1997) (advertising); see also
Labeling Requirements for Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1998); see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also
Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
157. See 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1997) (labeling); see also 27 U.S.C. § 205(0 (1997) (advertising); see also
Labeling Requirements for Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1998); see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also
Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
158. See supra notes 144-57 and accompanying text (examining how EU regulations on wine labels are more
burdensome than U.S. regulations on wine labels).
159. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28 (defining a "lot mark" as a mark used for the purposes of determining
the lot or batch of wine to which the bottle belongs).
160. See id.; see also Council Regulation 2392/89, art. 26, 1989 OJ. (L 232).
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is preceded by an ostensible and distinct capital "L.',161 This imposes an added
burden on U.S. wine companies because U.S. law does not require the mark. 62
Second, the EU has imposed unfair marketing regulations on the treatment of
awards on wine labels. 63 The EU only allows a wine bottle to display awards
received in a competition officially recognized in the EU.' 64 Ironically, the EU only,
recognizes its own competitions, which provides a disadvantage to U.S. wines in
marketing.1
65
Finally, the EU and the U.S. have imposed different standards for print size for
displaying the percentage of alcohol and the net contents.' 66 The EU has set the
minimum character sizes for alcohol percentage at 2-5mm, while the range for dis-
playing net contents is 3-6mm, according to the volume of the bottle.67 This creates
a difficulty for U.S. wines, because the United States has set the character size of
alcohol content at a maximum size of 3mm.' 6 It is expensive for U.S. wine
companies to comply with these unnecessarily burdensome regulations.1
69
D. Regulations on Oenological Practices
Wine, as an agricultural product, is subject to health and safety regulations for
the protection of consumers.' Nations attempt to protect the health and safety of
wine consumers through the regulation of oenological practices.' Oenological
practices are the specific methods used by wine companies for the harvesting,
production, and preservation of wine. 2 Thus, the EU and the U.S. both regulate the
oenological practices of wines grown and produced for human consumption within
their respective markets. 73
161. See Council Regulation 2392/89, art. 26, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
162. Compare Council Regulations 2392/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232), and 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309), with
Labeling Requirements for Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1998).
163. See Council Regulation 2392/89, art. 26, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
164. See Council Regulation 2392/89, art. 26, 1989 OJ. (L 232) (providing that a description on the labeling
of wines may be supplemented by an award granted to the wine in question by an official body or body officially
recognized); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
165. See Council Regulation 2392/89, art. 26, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 28.
166. See Council Regulation 239289, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990
OJ. (L 309); see also Labeling Requirements for Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1998).
167. See Council Regulation 2392/89. 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990
OJ. (L 309).
168. See Labeling Requirements for Wine, 27 C.F.R. § 4.30 (1998).
169. See Wilson, supra note 33.
170. See generally Annex VI of Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (setting forth the basic
oenological practices and processes that are allowed by the EU); see also generally Production of Wine, 27 C.F.R.
§§ 24.175-254 (1998) (providing the U.S. accepted oenological methods).
171. See Annex VI of Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84); see also generally Production of Wine,
27 C.F.R. §§ 24.175-254 (1998).
172. See WEBSTER's DICTIONARY 754 (3d ed. 1986) (defining "oenology" as the study of wines and wine-
making); see also BOOK OF CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 176-94 (discussing the various oenological
processes).
173. See Annex VI of Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84); see also generally Production of Wine,
27 C.F.R. §§ 24.175-254 (1998).
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Nevertheless, the specific restrictions and regulations of oenological practices
that the EU imposes on imported wine are still considered trade barriers. 74 The EU,
through Council Regulation 822/87 provided common rules for defining the
authorized oenological practices and processes for wine products to be marketed and
sold in the EU.' 75 The wine products that fail to conform with the authorized
oenological practices and processes may not be legally marketed or sold within the
EU. t76 For the most part, the EU rejects oenological practices which do not
specifically comport with intrinsic EU methods and standards.' 77 This is the general
policy of the EU.1
78
The EU methods and standards are provided in various EU Council Regulations
and the subsequent amendments to these regulations.' 79 For example, the EU restricts
the importation of wines that do not maintain a standard minimum and maximum
alcohol content.'so Another example is the EU mandates that oenological processes
and practices for wine intended for direct human consumption must conform to such
items as the use of heat treatment, t81 aeration,1 or bubbling using nitrogen,1 Plus
many other similar requirements.184
The EU maintains that it regulates oenological practices for health, safety and
quality reasons. 85 Nonetheless, these regulations amount to trade barriers because
not all countries, including the United States, utilize the same oenological practices
174. See 1996 National Trade Estimate, European Union, USTR government reports, Netscape, 1996,
(visited Jan. 31, 1998) <http.//www.ustr.gov/reportsInte/1996/eu.htrnl> [hereinafter 1996 NTE].
175. See generally Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (replacing 337/79 as the regulation on the
common organization of the market in wine).
176. See id. (stating that it is advisable to draw up common rules defining at Community level the oenological
practices and processes which are the only ones authorized for most wine products).
177. See generally id.; see also 1996 NTE, supra note 174 (providing that current EU regulations require
imported wines to be produced with only those oenological practices which are authorized for the production of
EU wine).
178. See generally Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84); see also 1996 NTE, supra note 174.
179. See Annex VI of Council Regulation 82287, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (setting forth the basic oenological
practices and processes that are allowed by the EU). For an example of an amendment to Council Regulation
822/87, see Council Regulation 1544/95, 1995 OJ. (L 148); see also Council Regulation 1108/82, 1982 O.J. (L
133) (providing for the determination of Community methods for the analysis of wines); see also generally Council
Regulation 3220/90, 1990 OJ. (L 308) (laying down conditions for the use of certain oenological practices). For
an example of an amendment to Council Regulation 3220/90, see Council Regulation 2053/97, 1997 OJ. (L 287).
180. See generally Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (stating that it appears necessary to provide
that certain import wines intended for direct human consumption must have a minimum actual alcoholic strength
corresponding to that of table wines).
181. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 488 (providing that heat treatment is when the wine has gone
through a process of thermotherapy).
182. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 7 (explaining that aeration is the deliberate and controlled
exposure to a substance of air, and particularly to its reactive component oxygen).
183. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 677 (defining the process of bubbling or boiling of nitrogen,
as a mineral element and inert colorless, odorless and tasteless gas that is extremely useful to both grape.growing
and wine-making).
184. See Annex VI of Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84).
185. See Introductory Body of Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (setting forth that these
oenological restrictions are imposed in order to guarantee a certain quality level, proper vinification and
preservation of wine products).
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and processes as does the EU. t86 Many wine producing nations possess their own
unique system of oenological processes and practices.'17 A safe and effective
oenological method takes time to develop and perfect. 88 These EU mandated
standards effectively act as a trade barrier to importers, because an importer must
conform to these extremely technical requirements of oenological methods.
8 9
However, the United States has obtained some temporary concessions from the
EU in this area."9 Since the mid-1980's, the EU has permitted use of some methods
of U.S. oenological practices by allowing extensions to temporary EU regulatory
exemptions.1tg The EU has provided a derogation to the policy of U.S. wine com-
panies having to strictly conform to EU methods in order to have the ability to
market and sell their products within the EU. 92 The EU provided the derogations to
their policy for the purpose of fostering harmonious development of trade in wine
products between the EU and the U.S.1 93 The EU allows U.S. practices in the realm
of scientific knowledge, which have proven to be equivalent to oenological processes
permitted within the Community.194 The EU asserted that the United States has an
effective control system in force. 195 In particular, the EU declared that the U.S. is in
compliance with provisions governing the production, marketing and disposal of
wine196 for direct human consumption.97
186. See 1996NTE, supra note 174 (asserting that not all U.S. oenological practices are authorized in the EU,
which implies that the U.S. is not utilizing all the same oenological practices as the EU).
187. See BOOKOFCAI.MRNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 185 (describing some differences between California
wines and French wines of experimenting with malolactic fermentation in Chardonnays). "Malolactic fermentation
is the conversion by malolactic bacteria of wine's malic acid to the weaker acid, lactic acid." Id.
188. See Introductory Body of Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 O.J. (L 176) (recognizing the extent to
which the United States has spent time for compliance with provisions governing the production and marketing of
wine, and the wine imports have undergone certain oenological processes which have been developed to be
identical or equivalent to oenological processes permitted in the Community); see also BOOK OFCALmoRNIA WINE,
supra note 151, at 160-161 (presenting the fact that winemaking is a complex process).
189. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174.
190. See 1996NTTE, supra note 174; see also Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176), last amended
by Council Regulation 2612/97, 1997 OJ. (L 354) (extending the period of the exemption to December 31, 1998).
191. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174; See Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176), last amended by
Council Regulation 2612/97, 1997 OJ. (L 353).
192. See 1996NTE, supra note 174; see also art. 1, Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176) (asserting
by way of derogation of EU oenological regulations, it shall be permitted for a wine company to offer or dispose
of wine products for direct human consumption that are derived from grapes harvested and vinified in the territory
of the United States for which certain processes authorized may have been used during manufacturing or storage
operations).
193. See Introductory Body of Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176). However, at the time of this
regulation's enactment, the U.S. wine industry did not possess a strong foothold in the European market, and
Europe dominated the U.S. market at the time. See also Walker, supra note 9 (providing the significant fact that
in 1986, the total value of U.S. wine exports were only US$61 million, less than the US$84 million gain in 1996).
In 1986, the countries of the present EU were the world leaders in the production and sales of wine. See id.
Therefore, it can be implied that the EU had more to gain by allowing this derogation in order to keep U.S.
restrictions of their products at a minimum. See id.
194. See Introductory Body of Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176).
195. See id.
196. Production, marketing and disposal of wine refers to oenological practices here.
197. See Introductory Body of Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176).
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The EU's derogations granted to U.S. wine companies, have only been a series
of extensions to EU regulatory exemptions which are merely temporary.'98 Without
these temporary exemptions, the majority of U.S. wines would be immediately pro-
hibited from entering the EU.'99 Additionally, not all of the U.S.'s oenological
practices are authorized in the EU." In order for an importer to have its wine making
practices approved by the EU, it must apply to the European Union Commission and
provide numerous technical studies which may take many years. 0° This presents a
real problem for U.S. wine companies who have gained some market share in the EU
to both maintain their current market share and to expand their sales and market
share in the future.2°2
The EU has only granted temporary acceptance for some U.S. oenological
practices, practices which have been previously acknowledged as satisfactory by the
EU by implication of its temporary exemptions of U.S. practices.m Thus, it appears
the EU is not regulating U.S. oenological practices for the protection of health and
safety of the EU consumers, but is illegitimately restricting the U.S. by impeding
U.S. imports.2 Therefore, the United States should seek long-term EU acceptance
of the oenological practices of U.S. wine companies which are now temporarily
accepted, and obtain further acceptance of other U.S. oenological practices.
E. Certification Regulations
The certification regulations administered by the EU are closely related to the
labeling, marketing, and oenological regulations0 5 Certification regulation is the
process that wine importers must go through to obtain approval and become qualified
to import.2° The certification process is the process which actually determines
whether an importer is in compliance with the labeling and oenological regu-
198. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174; see also Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176).
199. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174; see also Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176).
200. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174; see also Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176); see also Annex
VI of Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (listing certain authorized oenological practices and processes
within the EU).
201. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 29.
202. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174.
203. See 1996NT, supra note 174; see also Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176), last amended
by Council Regulation 2612/97, 1997 OJ. (L 353).
204. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 30 (proclaiming that because the EU gave special concessions to
Australian oenological methods in its 1992 Wine Agreement, which was a display of leniency, this conveys that
the EU's true motive behind its strict oenological and labeling standards is protectionism); see generally Agreement
Between the European Community and Australia on Trade in Wine, 1994 OJ. (L 86) (expounding on EU
concessions to Australia). See also infra notes 257-71 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that the
United States may have a valid claim against the EU in the World Trade Organization for its restrictive policies of
U.S. oenological practices).
205. See Barrier ofAmerican Goods, supra note 127.
206. See Introductory Body of Council Regulation 2390/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Barrier of American
Goods, supra note 127; see also Council Regulation 822/87, art. 70, 1987 OJ. (L 84).
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lations. ° This is the official procedure where U.S. wine making practices are
approved and certified.208 The European Union requires that imported wines meet
compositional limits according to European Union standards. More specifically,
Council Regulation 2390/89 provides that the imported products covered by Council
Regulation 822/872'0 must be accompanied by a certificate and an analysis report
issued by a body or service designated by an importer of the product's origin which
meets the conditions regulated by Council Regulation 822/87.Vn In order for an
exporter to demonstrate these standards have been met, a laboratory analysis is
required.2 2 This laboratory analysis has to be completed either by an EU laboratory,
or by a laboratory officially recognized by the country in which the wine
originated.21 3 The analysis requires information such as total alcohol strength by
volume, actual alcoholic strength by volume, total dry extract,
2 14 total acidity, 215
volatile acid content t6 citric acid content,21
7 and the total sulphur dioxide content.28
Compliance with this certification regulation is time-consuming and adds costs
to the wine producer?' 9 According to the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative, this procedure is a barrier to the free movement of these products within
207. See Introductory Body of Council Regulation 2390189, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Barrier of American
Goods, supra note 127; see also Council Regulation 822187, art. 70, 1987 OJ. (L 84).
208. See Council Regulation 2390/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Barrier of American Goods, supra note
127; see also Council Regulation 822187, art. 70, 1987 OJ. (L 84).
209. See Commission Regulation 2390/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Barrier of American Goods, supra
note 127.
210. See generally Council Regulation 82287, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (providing for the establishment of rules
governing production and control of the development of wine-growing potential, rules governing oenological
practices and processes, a price system, and rules governing intervention and other measures to improve market
conditions, arrangement for trade with third countries, and rules governing circulation and release to the market).
211. See Council Regulation 2390/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Barrier of American Goods, supra note
127; see also Council Regulation 822187, 1987 OJ. (L 84) art. 70 (providing that imported wines must complete
a laboratory analysis).
212. See Council Regulation 2390/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232); see also Barrier of American Goods, supra note
127; see also Council Regulation 822187, art. 70, 1987 OJ. (L 84).
213. See Council Regulation 2390/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232) art. 1.
214. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 376 (explaining that dry extract is the sum of the non-
volatile solids of a wine: the sugars, non-volatile acids, minerals, phenolics, glycerol, glycols, and traces of other
substances such as proteins, pectins and gums).
215. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 4 (defining acidity as the fresh, tart, or sour taste produced
by the natural organic acids present in a liquid).
216. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 1052 (adding that volatile acidity of a wine is its total
concentration of those naturally occurring organic aaids of wines that happen to be separable by distillation).
217. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 240 (stating that citric acid is a common plant acid, abundant
in some fresh fruits such as lemons, but rare in grapes). It is also one of the acids used in wine-making for the
purposes of acidification. Id.
218. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 929 ([providing sulphur dioxide is formed when elemental
sulphur is burned in air, it is the chemical compound most widely used by the wine-maker, principally as a
preservative and a disinfectant). Sulphur dioxide, as fumes from burning sulphur, has been used since antiquity to
preserve and disinfect during the production and storage of foods. Id.
219. See Barrier of American Goods, supra note 127 (mentioning that certification procedures may serve as
barriers to the free movement of products within the EU and can cause lengthy delays in sales due to the need to
have products tested and certified to account for differing national requirements); see also Wine Inst., supra note
4, at 31 (estimating that this process costs US$80 - US$ 100 for each type of wine).
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the EU and can cause lengthy delays in sales due to the need to have products tested
and certified to account for differing national requirements.
One possible solution to eliminate this barrier is for the United States to obtain
a bilateral agreement with the EU for a mutual recognition of testing methods and
certification measures.2 't In addition, the United States needs to obtain concessions
for the harmonization of standards linked to the evolving EU-wide legislative
standards.m2 The United States could limit the cost to its wine makers by
harmonizing standard and testing methods with the EU and therefore reducing the
effect these methods have as barriers to trade.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON GEOGRAPHIC NAMES
The issue of geographic names on the wine bottles continues to be a pugnacious
issue in negotiation between the U.S. and the EU.m The EU has continued to restrict
the use of protected geographical names (such as Champagne, Burgundy and
Chablis) to grapes produced in those regions.24 The European Union does not allow
certain wines with names that the EU classifies as a European Appellation of
Origin to be sold within the EU.
The reason for this restriction by the EU is that European wines have sustained
a long tradition of labeling and selling wines based on the region of origin of the type
of grape utilized in making the wine.m Each region's distinct quality is regulated by
strict guidelines with respect to variety,m yields,22 irrigation,m and other production
practices.23' These regional practices provide the unique characteristics and quality
of the wine that is grown and produced. z2 For example, even though Burgundy is a
220. See Barrier of American Goods, supra note 127.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also Chen, supra note 19, at 29 (discussing the differences
of how the EU and the U.S. recognize the extent of geographic names which equals friction); see also BOOK OF
CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 154, at 440-43 (describing the controversy between Europe and the United States
over U.S. winemakers continued use of semi-generic names).
224. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66.
225. As stated in the introduction of this Comment, the EU defines a geographic indication or an appellation
of origin as the designation of a country, a region, or a locality which serves to indicate that a product originates
from that place and owes its quality or characteristics to its geographical surroundings. See Commission Regulation
3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see also Chen, supra note 19, at 29.
226. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66;
see also Chen, supra note 19, at 29.
227. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66;
see also Chen, supra note 19, at 29.
228. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 1048 (discussing vine varieties are "distinct types of vine
within one species of vine genus vitis").
229. See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 71, at 1061 (discussing a yield as "an important statistic in wine
production, which measures how much a vineyard produces").
230. See WEBSTER's DICTIONARY 1196 (3d ed. 1986) (stating irrigation is the process of watering the
vineyards).
231. See Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66.
232. See id.
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well known-region in France that produces quality red wines with pinot noir grapes,
pinot noir seldom appears as a geographic indication on Burgundy labelsY 3 More-
over, France's Bordeaux wines seldom mention the name of cabernet sauvignon, and
Champagnes rarely mention the name of chardonnay, though these are the dominant
grapes used in these regions.2- Thus, the reason why certain EU wines are labeled
with the name of Burgundy is because these wines originate and are produced within
the specific region of Burgundy, France.23s
In contrast, the name Burgundy is utilized by U.S. wine companies to denote a
specific type of vine and grape; not to identify the region where the wine
originated. z6 Moreover, U.S. wine makers consider terms such as Burgundy,
Champagne and Chablis as semi-generic labels.237 The U.S. wine companies deem
these terms as semi-generic labels because they have not had the long history of
utilizing the appellations of origin as a distinguishing attractive marketing tool
compared with the EU wine companies.23 The United States within its domestic
wine market, does not impose many restrictions on geographic names ? 9 As
previously stated in this Comment, the ATF only imposes regulations on items such
as alcohol content. ° Therefore, the EU and the U.S. have two competing views on




235. See ALExIs LiCmN, AXs LcHiNE's NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WiNES AND SPIrrs 128-31 (4th ed.
1985) (providing Burgundy is an appellation of origin from the central eastern region of France-known as
Burgundy).
236. See id.; see BOOKOFCALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 440-41 (explaining that semi-generic names
are considered by the United States as specific wine types).
237. See BOOK OF CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 440-41; see also LICHINE, supra note 235 at 128-31;
Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66; see Chen, supra note 19, at 52 (asserting that by virtue of their own success,
the French wines most familiar to the American public-Burgundy, Chablis, Champagne are the likeliest to be
observed as generic designations); see also 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (1997) (providing that semi-generic designations may
be used to designate wines of an origin other than that indicated by such name only if there appears in direct
conjunction therewith an appropriate appellation of origin disclosing the true place of origin of the wine, and if the
wine so designated conforms to the standard of identity, and if no standard, to the trade understanding of such class
or type). Examples of semi-generic names recognized by the ATF are Chablis, Claret, Champagne and Chianti.
See id.
238. See BOOK OF CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 440-43 (describing the controversy between the
United States and France in utilizing geographic names on wine labels). However, the United States does recognize
some U.S. appellation of origins to describe areas such as the Napa Valley where a particular wine originates. See
id. at 443-44; 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.25, 9.23 (1997). These U.S. appellations of origins are used to denote a wine where
at least 75 percent of the wine is derived from the fruit or agricultural product in the specific viticultural area
indicated. See BOOK OF CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151. at 443-44; see also 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.25, 9.23 (1997).
Moreover, these U.S. appellations of origin such as the Napa Valley, are used to denote where the wine originated,
not as a name for the wine such as Chablis. See BOOK OF CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 443-44. Therefore,
the United States and the EU place a different value on the use of geographic names. See id.
239. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.21 (1997).
240. See id.
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When U.S. companies export wine to the EU, they must comport with the EU
restrictions and regulations on names of origin.UI This adds costs to the marketing
and labeling of wine because the U.S. wine companies must develop different labels
and names for their wine products destined for the EU. u 2 These additional costs
amount to trade barriers within the EU 1 3
Although EU restrictions on geographic names are trade barriers to U.S.
importers, these restrictions do have some redeeming value. The EU and the United
States assess the value and purpose of geographical names from two completely dif-
ferent viewpoints. 4 United States wine companies generally view a geographic
name as a property right, such as a trademark.? 5 Additionally, U.S. wine makers
utilize geographical names as a marketing tool, and not to identify the wine product
with a particular area of the country.2m On the other hand, the EU views a geographic
name as a manifestation and guarantee that the wine product comes from a specific
wine growing area, which conforms to a certain tradition?4 7 The EU possesses the
opinion that the specific origin of the wine itself has an inherent value because EU
consumers believe that no place outside the region of the geographic indication can
produce the same product that the consumer expects.248 Furthermore, EU consumers
believe that the geographic name manifests a particular type of wine with unique
characteristics and qualities, that is endemic to the specific geographic area where the
wine originates.249 The EU's basis for protecting a geographic name is the inherent
value to a wine of identifying the product by its origin, this is a legitimate concern
and desire of the EU.1° With the U.S. and the EU viewing the value and purpose of
241. See Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309); see also Council Regulation 2392/89, 1989
OJ. (L 232).
242. See Wilson, supra note 33.
243. See BOOKOFCALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 428 (noting that European prohibition of wine sales
for California wines that used a semi-generic name has been as trade barrier since the Madrid Convention of 1891,
which forbid trade in wines that utilized European geographic names).
244. See Louis Lorvellec, You've Got To Fight For Your Right To Party: A Response To Professor Jim Chen,
5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 65, 68-71 (1996) (discussing the difference between Professor Chen. who wrote from
the American viewpoint that a geographic name is valued by its property right, and the French view that a
geographic name derives its value from the characteristics and qualifies of the region of origin of the wine itself).
245. See Chen, supra note 19, at 50 (stating the ultimate question of exclusive rights to the geographic terms
such as Chablis or Champagne depend on federal and state trademark law).
246. See Chen, supra note 19, at 50-51; 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (1997). For example Chianti, is not recognized as
a Appellation of Origin in the U.S. See id.
247. See Lorvellec, supra note 244, at 67.
248. See Lorvellec, supra note 244, at 67, 70 (asserting that for the information to be accurate on an AOC
label of wine, no place outside of the AOC region can produce the exact same product that the consumer expects).
"In some regions, one could find the same geographic conditions (the nature), but not the human (culture)." See
id. "In others the human factors may be the same, but the geology or climate does not produce those characteristics
expected by the consumer." See id. "It is a matter of ensuring the product conforms to the quality that the consumer
expects." See id.
249. See Lorvellec, supra note 244, at 70.
250. See id at 65,70 (citing Harvard University as an example of something that has a distinct meaning, both
geographically and qualitatively, which has an inherent value to it, just as a distinct geographic indication has in
identifying a wine to its origin).
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a geographic name from completely different standpoints, tension between the two
sides over regulation and protection persists.25'
The U.S.'s position is that its wine companies will continue to utilize previously
accepted terms for the U.S. market, and at the same time, continue to make changes
in using the terms to qualify for selling their wine in the EU. 252Therefore, geographic
names will remain a hotly debated issue between the EU and the United States until
some type of compromise through a bilateral agreement, can be reached, or in the
alternative, the WTO adjudicates the matter in a suit filed either by the EU or the
United States.
V. Two ALTERNATrVE MEANS TO REDUCE TRADE BARRIERS
United States wine exporters have two alternative means to reduce trade barriers.
The first possible means of reducing trade barriers is to seek legal recourse for some
of these barriers through the World Trade Organization (WTO). 54 The second
possibility is the establishment of bilateral agreements between the United States and
the EU. This portion of this Comment is neither a call to arms for U.S. wine
companies, nor is it an advocation of a certain position, or a course of action. The
purpose of this part is to list and discuss the two primary routes the United States and
EU may take to settle these disputes on trade barriers of imported wines into the EU.
251. See Agricultural Outlook supra note 66; see also Chen, supra note 19, at 50-51 (recognizing that U.S.
winemakers utilize geographic indications as a property right or marketing tool); see also Lorvellec, supra note 244,
at 70 (asserting that the purpose of a geographic name is to manifest that a particular wine actually possesses the
qualities and characteristics which are due to the geographic location of its origin, and to impart to the product a
certain quality and specific character of a nature which distinguishes them).
252. See Chen, supra note 19; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66.
253. See infra notes 272-96 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of WTO action based on a
dispute over geographical names).
254. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the international dispute settlement body to settle trade
disputes for members of the WTO. See PnU.RE PESCATORE, WUnIAM J. DAVEY & ANDRES F. LOWENrELD,
HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATr DIsPuTE SETLEMENT, Vol. 1 & 2, at 9, 12 (1991, revised 1996) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
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A. Ramifications of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
of the General Agreement of Tariffs & Trade and the World Trade
Organization
The WTO5 is one avenue for the United States to utilize for settlement of the
increasingly contentious issues of geographic names and oenological regulations. The
Uruguay Round of GATT's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (ASPM) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) are the specific trade agreements that could
determine these two issues.5
6
255. On January 1, 1995, participating nations, including the United States and the EU, at the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATIh, created the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to provide adjudication for trade disputes between nations. See Agreement Establishing The
World Trade Organization, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in FRANK W.
SWACKER, ET AL., 1-13 (1996). With the establishment of the VTO, there are new opportunities to seek recourse
against nations that continue to restrict wine imports. See HANDBOOK, supra note 254. (Note: some commentators
debate the actual effectiveness of the WTO in practice to settle international trade disputes. However, this subject
is outside the scope of this Comment, which will instead provide how the WTO should work according to its
purpose and articles.) According to Article III of the WTO, the "VTO shall facilitate the implementation,
administration and operation, and further the objectives of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements." Id. art. III. "The WTO shall also provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning
their multilateral trade regulations in matters dealt with under this Agreement." Id. Additionally, the "WTO may
provide a forum for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations, and a
framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations, as may be decided by the Ministerial
Conference." Id This multilateral GAIT agreement, giving life to the WTO, establishes a dispute settlement system
which mandates contracting members comply with the Uruguay Round agreements and the WTO or else face
penalties by the complaining party imposing unilateral trade sanctions. See HANDBOOK, supra note 254. Signatory
nations of the WTO may file a claim as a Member to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. See Ramon
R. Gupta, Comment, Appellate Body Interpretation Of The WTO Agreement: A Critique In Light Of Japan-Taxes
On Alcoholic Beverages, 6 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 683, 692 (1997). To initiate proceedings against another
Member, the complaining party must first participate in a consultation session with the party to whom the
complaining party is aggrieved. See id. at 692. If no settlement is made between the two opposing parties, the
complaining party may request the DSB establish a panel to adjudicate the matter. See id. The WTO may prove
important in the future for U.S. wine companies attempting to be in the process of marketing and exporting their
products in the EU. See HANDBOOK, supra note 254. If any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, or any other
unilateral trade agreement in regards to wine are violated, the United States can have legal recourse through the
WTO by filing a claim. See id. Before the WTO was established, the United States had to resort to the threat of a
trade war, with another nation or trading partner, over a trade dispute about market access. See Tom Incantalupo,
U.S. Slaps Big Tariffs on Europe, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 1992, at 8 (stating as an example, in 1992, the United States
almost entered into a trade war with the EU by imposing a 200% punitive duty on EU white wine over the stalemate
in talks over European government price supports for oilseeds). Since the WTO has been established, a forum is
provided where disputing parties may file claims for GAIT violations and may argue their case and allow the WTO
to decide the proper relief. See HANDBOOK, supra note 254. Therefore, this way to settle disputes is favorable
because it provides an alternative to a mutually damaging trade war.
256. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Office of the United States
Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, Final Texts of the GATI' Uruguay Round Agreements,
Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in FRANK W. SWACKER, ET AL, 61-75 (1996) [hereinafter ASPM Final Texts]; see also
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Executive Office of the President, Final Texts of the Uruguay Round Agreements, Apr. 15, 1994,
reprinted in FRANK W. SWACKER, ET AL, 331-66 (1996) [hereinafter TRIPs Final Texts].
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1. Possible U.S. Claim Against the EU for the EU's Oenological
Restrictions
The United States may find it prudent to bring a claim before the WTO for the
EU's restrictions on U.S. oenological practices.5 As stated previously, these EU
oenological restrictions impede the free flow of U.S. wines into the EU?" If the
United States decides to bring a claim against the EU for these oenological
restrictions, the United States will probably claim the EU violated the ASPM
agreement. 9
The ASPM agreement was enacted to ensure import restrictions placed on
phytosanitary and sanitary' measures which were based on legitimate health and
safety reasons rather than serving as disguised trade barriers.6 t Although the ASPM
agreement does not establish or deal with any particular sanitary or phytosanitary
measure such as an oenological regulation, the agreement does establish a number
of general requirements and procedures to ensure that a measure is intended to
protect against the stated risk, and not to serve as a covert trade barrier.262 Since the
EU regulates oenological practices for health, safety and quality reasons, the EU
oenological regulations of imported wines are phytosanitary and sanitary measures
subject to the ASPM agreement.263
The United States continues its attempt to obtain permanent recognition from the
EU for many of their oenological practices.2 4 The EU mandates that wine imports
comply with both the EU practices and regulations, and those of the wine exporter's
country.2 65 One of the requirements of the ASPM agreement is import restrictions
must have a proven scientific basis to restrict access to consumers.26 Although the
EU is unable to demonstrate any health risks from any current U.S. wine making
257. See infra notes 259-71 and accompanying text (discussing that the United States may have a valid claim
to the WTO for possible EU violations of the ASPM agreement).
258. See supra notes 126-69 and accompanying text.
259. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 30; 1996 NTE, supra note 174; Overview of the Agreement On The
Application Of Sanitary And Phytosanitary Measures, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive
Office of the President, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, Sep. 27, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 761638 (GATT) [hereinafter Overview of ASPM Statement].
260. See Overview of ASPM Statement, supra note 259 (defining phytosanitary and sanitary measures as
measures that "generally deal with protecting human, animal, and plant life and health from risks of plant or animal-
borne pests or diseases, or additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or
feedstuffs").
261. See id. (explaining that the purpose of the Agreement was to ensure these measures are "in fact intended
to protect against the risk asserted, rather than to serve as a disguised trade barrier").
262. See id.
263. See Council Regulation 822187, 1987 OJ. (L 84) (setting forth that these oenological restrictions are
imposed in order to guarantee a certain quality level, proper vinification and preservation of wine products); see
also Overview of ASPM Statement, supra note 259.
264. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174.
265. See Council Regulation 82287, 1987 OJ. (L 84); see also Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L
176).
266. See Overview of ASPM Statement, supra note 259 (stating that the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement relies on whether the measure has a basis in science and is based on a risk assessment).
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practices, the EU still reserves the right to refuse access to those U.S. wines it deems
to have undergone unacceptable changes in composition, or do not meet EU
standards.2 7 The U.S.'s view is that the EU restrictions on U.S. oenological practices
are not based on scientific reasons, but instead arbitrary restrictions on market access
which constitute trade barriers to the free flow of wine within the EU.6 The EU's
restrictions on U.S. oenological practices are barriers the United States is presently
attempting to reduce or eliminate. If the United States cannot obtain these
reductions through a bilateral agreement with the EU, the U.S. may decide to file a
claim with the WTO against the EU for violating the ASPM agreement."7 Likewise,
if the United States can prove certain EU restrictions do not have a scientific basis,
then the United States has a valid claim against the EU in the WTO.
271
2. Possible Dispute in the WTO Over Geographical Names
The use of geographic names on wines is another dispute between the U.S. and
the EU that may be determined by the WTO. United States wine companies desire
the ability to continue utilizing geographic names considered by U.S. wine
companies as semi-generic indications on wines sold within the U.S. market as well
as wines exported to the EU.2 72 On the other hand, the EU wants to prohibit the U.S.
267. See id.
268. See id.; see also Wine Inst., supra note 4. at 30. This type of argument by the EU of restricting a product
based on stated but questionable health and safety concerns has not been exclusive to wine. See GATe Dispute
Panel Report on United States Complaint on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, republished in
LAW AND PRACICE OFTHE WORLD TRADE ORGAN7_ATION, Case Booklet X, at 18-20 (Aug. 18 1997). The United
States brought suit against the EU in the WTO for violating the ASPM Agreement for EU's ban on the importation
and sale of animals, that had been administered from some of the hormones at issue for growth promotion purposes.
See id. The United States claimed that this ban was inconsistent with the ASPM agreement because this ban was
not based on a legitimate scientific purpose, but was instead an unjustifiable protectionist measure for the purpose
of keeping U.S. beef products out the EU market. See id. The EU asserted that this ban was not inconsistent with
the ASPM agreement because it was based on scientific principles based on a risk study that called for regulatory
action. See id. However, the WTO panel concluded that the EU had in fact violated the ASPM agreement with this
ban. See id. at 269. The panel held that the EU, "by adopting arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of
sanitary protections it considers to be appropriate in different situations which result in discrimination or disguised
restriction on international trade, has acted inconsistently with the requirements contained in the Agreement of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures." Id. The United States might be able to utilize this decision and argue by
analogy that the EU is restricting U.S. oenological practices under a disguised restriction of international trade. As
previously discussed in this Comment, the EU has given temporary derogations to U.S. oenological processes. See
1996 NTE, supra note 174; see also Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176), last amended by Council
Regulation 2612/97, 1997 OJ. (L 353). Therefore, it appears, that since the EU has been consistently allowing some
of the U.S. oenological practices, although temporarily, that U.S. practices are safe, and the EU might be restricting
U.S. oenological processes as a disguised trade barrier. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 30.
269. See 1996 NTE, supra note 174.
270. See id.; see also ASPM Final Texts, supra note 256; see also infra notes 297-317 and accompanying
text (discussing possible reduction of trade barriers between the U.S. and the EU through bilateral or multilateral
agreements).
271. Because the regulation of oenological practices and processes is an extremely complex and technical
area, the determination of whether the U.S. has any merit to their claims, or the probability of the U.S. obtaining
a favorable ruling is beyond the scope of this Comment.
272. See Chen, supra note 19; See also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66.
The Transnational Lawyer/ VoL 11
wine makers from using EU protected geographical names within the United States,
as well as the EU market.273 The TRIPs agreement is the relevant GATT agreement
for a possible claim filed to the WTO on the issue of U.S. wine makers' use of
geographic names on wines.274
Articles 22 through 24 of the TRIPs agreement provide for the protection of
geographic indications.2 75 First, the TRIPs agreement compels signing nations to
provide an interested party the ability to prohibit the use of geographic indications
that misinform consumers regarding the geographic origin of a product.2 76 Second,
a country must either invalidate or refuse the registration of a trademark containing
a spurious representation of a product's geographical origin that tends to mislead
consumers. 277 Third, the TRIPs agreement forbids the use of a geographic name
which falsely conveys to consumers that the product originates in another area, even
though it in fact states the correct origin of the product.278 Fourth, Article 23 of the
TRIPs agreement provides specific protections for the geographic names of wines. 9
Here, under the TRIPs agreement, a geographic indication of a wine not originating
in its stated location may not be utilized or registered, although the actual geographic
origin is provided on the label.2 ° Furthermore, Articles 23 and 24 require signatory
nations to the TRIPs agreement to enter into further negotiations on the issue of geo-
graphic names."8
273. See BOOK OF CALIFORNIA WINE, supra note 151, at 440-43.
274. See generally TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256 (setting forth standards concerning the availability,
scope and use of geographic names).
275. See generally TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256; see also Summary of Provisions, Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office
of the President, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, Sept. 27, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 761796 [hereinafter TRIPs Statement].
276. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, art. 22 (providing "Members shall provide the legal means for
interested parties to prevent: the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or
suggests that the good in question originates in geographical area other than the true place of origin of the good");
see also, TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at Summary of Provisions.
277. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 22; see also TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at
Summary of Provisions.
278. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 22; see also TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at
Summary of Provisions.
279. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 23 (stating that each "Member shall provide the legal
means for interested parties to prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines from wines not originating
in the place indicated by the geographical indication in question, even where the true origin of the goods is indicated
or the geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as 'kind,' 'type,' 'style,'
'imitation' or the like"); see also Summary of Provisions, TRIPs Statement, supra note 275.
280. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256. at art. 23; see also TRIPs Statement supra note 275, Summary
of Provisions.
281. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at arts. 23, 24 (providing "in order to facilitate the protection
of geographical indications for wines, negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPs concerning the
establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines eligible
for protection in those Members participating in the system"); see also generally, TRIPs Statement, supra note 275,
at Summary of Provisions.
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There are some exceptions to these provisions.282 The prohibition in Article 23
is inapplicable if a geographic name has been used on a particular product for ten
years before April 15, 1994.283 Secondly, a nation does not have to prohibit the
continued use of a geographic indication that is used on a product where the
geographic name has been registered or its rights have been acquired through good
faith use.2 4 Finally, an exception applies to a geographic name obtained before the
TRIPs agreement was enacted, or before the country of origin instituted protections
for the geographic name285 The WTO decided on September 19, 1997, to begin
compiling what it terms a factual note on the use of geographic names on wines in
relation to the TRIPs agreement8
6
The EU may possibly bring a claim against the United States in the WTO for
violating the TRIPs agreement by U.S. practices of using semi-generic names on
their wine labels.2" The EU may assert the United States is violating the TRIPs
agreement because the uses of these semi-generic names might be false repre-
sentations misleading a consumer as to a wine's origin.m The United States may be
able to counter this argument by asserting that an exception under Article 24 of the
TRIPs agreement applies to most of the U.S.'s uses of semi-generic labels. The
United States has been allegedly using these semi-generic names for at least ten years
prior to the TRIPs agreement
The EU may also argue that the U.S. is violating the TRIPs agreement by failing
to reach an agreement on U.S. uses of semi-generic geographical names such as
Beaujolais or Burgundy.29 The EU interprets the provision requiring signatory
nations to enter into further negotiations on the issue of geographic indications, as
mandating negotiations for U.S. wine companies to phase out the use of semi-generic
282. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 24 (proclaiming inter alia, "nothing in this Section shall
require a Member to prevent continued and similar use of a particular geographical indication of another Member
identifying wines in connection with goods or services by any of its nationals or domiciliaries who have used that
geographical indication in a continuous manner with regard to the same or related goods or services in the territory
of that Member either (a) for at least 10 years preceding 15 April 1994 or (b) in good faith preceding that date");
see also TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at Summary of Provisions.
283. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 24; see also TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at
Summary of Provisions.
284. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 24; see also TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at
Summary of Provisions.
285. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 24 (providing where a trademark has been applied for or
registered in good faith, or where rights to a trademark have been acquired through use in good faith either: (a)
before the date of application of these provisions in that Member as defined in Part VI, or (b) before the
geographical indication is protected in its country of origin).
286. See WTO To Begin Examination Of Geographical Wine Descriptions, INT'L TRADE R,'m., WoRLD
NEWS, Sept. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14 ITR 1611.
287. See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
288. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at arts. 23, 24; see also TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at
Summary of Provisions.
289. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at art. 23, 24; see also TRIPs Statement, supra note 275, at
Summary of Provisions; see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 34.
290. See WTO To Begin Examination Of Geographical Wine Descriptions, supra note 286.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 11
names.29' Conversely, the U.S. interprets this provision as an obligation to discuss,
but not necessarily to reach an agreement on U.S. wine companies' use of semi-
generic geographic names.' The EU may assert this failure by the United States to
reach an agreement with the EU on this issue is a violation of the TRIPs
agreement.293 Both sides appear to have merits to their arguments, therefore this issue
will probably have to be settled by the WTO.2 However, the use of widely used
terms such as Champagne and Chablis will probably not have to be phased-out
because these terms have become so generically used outside of the EU, that the
intrinsic identification value of these names have significantly diminished. 95
Alternatively, the WTO may issue a ruling for U.S. wine makers to phase-out only
some of the semi-generic terms they use, while simultaneously requiring the EU to
allow U.S. wine companies to use the semi-generic geographical names such as
Champagne and Chablis that have lost their place of origin.
B. Reduction of EU Trade Barriers Through Bilateral Agreements
Another possible means of reducing EU trade barriers to imported wine is
through bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the EU.297 The EU market is less
open and imposes more burdens on U.S. wines than the United States imposes on EU
wine imported into the United States."8 However, except for the issues of geographic
names and oenological practices, the current trade barriers and restrictions imposed
by the EU toward imported wine do not appear to violate any international
agreement.299 Therefore, the best strategy for the United States to take to reduce these
EU trade barriers is to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements with the EU.3ro
In light of the trade gap, the U.S. should seek reductions of EU wine subsidies
and internal support programs.301 In order to level the playing field, the United States
has to obtain agreements with the EU to reduce the EU's level of support, because
291. See id.; see also Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 34.
292. See WTO To Begin Examination Of Geographical Wine Descriptions, supra note 286; see also Wine
Inst., supra note 4, at 34.
293. See WTO To Begin Examination Of Geographical Wine Descriptions, supra note 286; see also Wine
Inst., supra note 4, at 34.
294. If the EU can win its argument that the US's failure to reach an agreement with the EU on this issue is
a violation of the TRIPs agreement, the WTO could possibly set the basis forprotections of EU geographical names
by mandating that the U.S. reach an agreement with the EU for phasing out the use of some of the semi-generic
labels by U.S. wine companies. See TRIPs Final Texts, supra note 256, at arts. 23,24; see also TRIPs Statement,
rupra note 275, at Summary of Provisions.
295. See Chen, supra note 19, at 62.
296. See WTO To Begin Examination Of Geographical Wine Descriptions, supra note 286.
297. See infra notes 298-316 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 31-222 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 31-222 and accompanying text.
300. Since the EU trade barriers of tariffs, internal taxes, government subsidies and internal support, license
-gulations, labeling regulations, marketing regulations and certification regulations do not appear to be violating
ny international agreement, the only option left to the U.S. is to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements with
ie EU.
301. See Wine Inst., supra note 4, at 32; see also Agricultural Outlook, supra note 66.
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the U.S. public will not permit the United States to subsidize to the extent of the
EU? 2 With public concerns over the huge national debt, it is highly unlikely the
American people would be in favor of utilizing enormous amounts of public expen-
ditures to subsidize the wine industry so that U.S. wine companies could compete on
a more level playing field with the EU wine companies? 3
The United States should seek further reductions on EU wine tariffs through
bilateral agreements. Compared with other nations, the United States is a high
consumption society.3" Consequently, American consumers want the ability to buy
the products they desire.305 The U.S. government, in response to this public
sentiment, maintains a policy of keeping tariffs on imported goods into the United
States at low levels, and advocates a global market with low tariffs? 6 In light of
these views, it is more prudent for the U.S. to seek tariff reductions for wines
imported into the EU, rather than to raise tariffs in the United States to match EU
tariff rates on wine.
The U.S. imposes fewer regulations and restrictions upon labeling, marketing,
and certification of imported wines than does the EU.3 7 The United States should
seek more access to the EU market by bilateral agreements that would reduce or
eliminate some of these labeling, marketing and certification regulations which
impede the free circulation of imported wine within the EU? 8
302. See Steven Moore & Dean Stansel, How Corporate Welfare Won: Clinton and Congress Retreat from
Cutting Business Subsidies, CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS No. 254, May 15, 1996, (visited Feb. 8, 1998)
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-254.btml>; see also Anne-Marie Rosato, Corporate Welfare: Helping the
Greedy, Not the Needy, 1996, (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http.//www.nashville.nett-coa/preface.htm>; see also
National Debt Reduction, FAMILY OF EAGLES LTD. (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http:llfamofeasgles.comldebt.html>.
These articles manifest the unpopularity from the public of existing subsidies and internal support of U.S.
companies, and with the public concern over the national debt, increased subsidies and internal support for another
industry notably the wine industry is politically impossible in the United States.
303. See Moore & Stansel, supra note 302; see also Rosato, supra note 302; see also National Debt
Reduction, supra note 302..
304. See WusMitDmmr, RINTnESHADow oFTERsINoSUN204 (1991) (providing that since World War
H, the attention has been creating and stimulating demand sufficient to absorb the cornucopia of goods pouring out
from our unparalleled productive capabilities). Tax policies during this period were directly linked to consumption
and to questions of demand management. See id. Demand stimulus has tended to channel spending toward increased
consumption and less investment. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. To compare the amount of regulations the EU imposes on imported wines with the amount of regulations
the U.S. places on imported wines, see Council Regulation 2392t89, 1989 OJ. (L 232) (general rules for labeling
and marketing wine); see also Commission Regulation 3201/90, 1990 OJ. (L 309) (detailed rules for labeling and
marketing wine); see also Council Regulation 822/87, 1987 OJ (L 84) (provides for general rules for certification
of wine); see also Council Regulation 2390/89, 1989 OJ. (L 232) (provides for detailed rules for certification of
wine); see also Council Regulation 3887/89, 1989 O.J. (L 378) (amending Council Regulation 2390/89 by
extending the trial period from Dec. 31, 1989 to July 31, 1990); see also generally 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1997)
(labeling); see also 27 U.S.C. § 205(0 (1997) (advertising); see also generally Labeling and Advertising of Wine,
27 C.F.R. § 4 (1998).
308. See supra note 300 and accompanying text; see also Barrier ofAmerican Goods. supra note 127 (stating
that the USTR is attempting, through multilateral negotiations, to reduce EU restrictions affecting U.S. exports).
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Additionally, the issues of internal taxes and licensing requirements are de
minimis barriers to U.S. wine exporters.30 However, these types of barriers are
implemented by most nations and are generally not as unfair or discriminatory as the
other trade barriers.310 Unless the EU increases its licensing regulations on imported
wines, there appears no reason to press the EU on this matter. 3tl Additionally, the EU
is in the process of harmonizing its system of internal taxes. Therefore, the United
States must be patient and allow the EU to harmonize its system of internal taxes
before forming a policy to reduce EU's internal taxes, if it desires to form such
policy at all.31
The United States has a fair chance, through bilateral agreements, to reduce some
of these EU trade barriers to imported wine?13 It is in the best interests of both the
United States and the EU to settle these issues of trade barriers through a bilateral or
multilateral agreement rather than force the United States to initiate a trade war?'1
4
Since the U.S. imports more wine from the EU than the EU imports from the U.S.,
the U.S. should have some bargaining power to obtain concessions from the EU.
This is because it is not in the EU's interest, which has a net surplus in wine, to leave
the U.S. with no other choice than to enact sanctions against EU wine imported into
the U.S.315 The U.S. has had some past success in obtaining trade concessions from
the EU to reduce trade barriers to imported wines? 16 Therefore, because of the
United State's past success in reaching some agreements with the EU, the U.S.
should be successful in obtaining future bilateral agreements for the reduction of
trade barriers of wine imported in the EU.317
VI. CONCLUSION
There are massive differences and discrepancies between the EU and the U.S.
in their regulation of imported wine. The EU imposes more burdens on imported
wines than does the U.S.. Although these trade barriers appear to be inconsistent with
the Uruguay Round of GATf's spirit of reducing trade barriers to liberalize and
309. See supra notes 44-65 & 113-25 and accompanying text.
310. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 465; see also Commission Regulation 3388/81, 1981 OJ. (L 341).
311. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 465; see also Commission Regulation 3388/81, 1981 OJ. (L 341).
312. See McKelvey, supra note 5, at 465.
313. See infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
314. See Incantalupo, supra note 255 (where a trade war almost occurred between the U.S. and the EU in
1992 over the issue of EU restrictions on U.S. soybean products, and the U.S. was going to slap a punitive tariff
on EU white wines).
315. See Wine World In Review, supra note 2; see also French Wine in U.S. Export Boom, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESS, Oct. 1, 1997 (presenting figures that the exports of French table wine outside of Europe grew by 57 percent
last year, chiefly because of a boom in sales to the U.S.). This data manifests that the U.S. market is an important
market for EU wines, as conveyed by the fact that the U.S. market provided most of the huge increase to French
wine makers, who compose the EU's largest wine producing nation.
316. See Council Regulation 1873/84, 1984 OJ. (L 176) (recognizing certain U.S. oenological practices
based on an agreement with the U.S.).
317. See id.
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expand free trade among nations, 3 these regulations do not violate GATT or any
other international agreement. Except for the issues of the EU's oenological and
geographic indications regulations, the United States currently does not have any
legal recourse through the WTO from current trade restrictions and barriers. The
issues of EU regulations on oenological practices and geographic names might end
up before the WTO for adjudication. However, for the other trade barriers the United
States will have to seek additional trade agreements with the EU for increased and
fairer market access for the U.S. wine industry in the EU. 319
Wine appears to be one of the most lucrative and fastest growing agricultural
products that the United States now has to offer. Some of the U.S. wine companies
who have succeeded in the EU can resoundingly claim the Latin saying, "In Vino
Veritas," 32 because wine provides an enormous potential for wealth and oppor-
tunities for a wine maker. The United States should support the growth of this
industry by a vigorous strategy of opening up restrictive markets. Despite the trade
barriers the EU imposes on imported wine, the EU will remain one of the most
advantageous markets for U.S. wines. 2' Therefore, the United States should support
the U.S. wine industry by "leveling the playing field" with the EU for the inter-
national trading of wines. The United States can only accomplish this task through
an active and aggressive policy of reducing EU trade barriers on imported wines.
318. SeeAgreementOnAgriculture, supra note 36.
319. See supra notes 28-222 and accompanying text (stating that other barriers are tariffs, internal taxes,
government subsidies and internal support, licensing, labeling, marketing and certification regulations).
320. "In Vino Veritas," is Latin for, "In Wine there is Truth."
321. See Wine World In Review, supra note 2.
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